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CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW. By Barbara Wootton. London: Stevens &
Sons. 1963. Pp. viii, 118.
I
Tnis is a remarkable book by a remarkable Englishwoman. Barbara Woot-
ton has a long established reputation as an economist and social scientist; for
thirty years she has served as a magistrate in one of London's busiest courts;
and as Baroness Wootton of Abinger has contributed to debates on domestic
policy in the House of Lords a steady flow of lucid, astringent, but always con-
structive criticism. She is, as she announces on the title page of this book, a
layman so far as law is concerned notwithstanding her long service as a magis-
trate, but since 1959 she has devoted her versatile talents to the critical assess-
ment of some long-venerated doctrines of English criminal law. Her main, but
not exclusive concern in this field has been the conventional conception of
criminal responsibility expressed in the doctrine of niens rea according to which
liability to conviction for serious crimes depends not merely on the accused
having done the act forbidden by law but on his having done it in a certain
state of mind or will. Though her first investigations were confined to the crim-
inal responsibility of the mentally abnormal her name has now become identi-
fied with the claim that the whole doctrine of hens rca and the conception of
responsibility embodied in it is an irrational hindrance to sound social policy:
if, as many would admit, the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent crime,
the doctrine should be eliminated or at least allowed to "wither away." Though
her argument and conclusions are still matters for debate, her writing on this
topic, as this little book amply demonstrates, felicitously combines elegance and
clarity with a terseness of style which contrasts favourably with the inflated
and jargon-laden diction of much modern writing on this subject. Her three
main contributions, Social Science and Social Pathology,' Dimninishcd Respon-
sibility; a Layman's Tie-w,2 and the book now under review, have done much
to raise the whole level in England of the discussion of the basic principles of
the criminal law: she has forced her opponents (in some cases apparently for
the first time) to ask themselves precisely why they value the doctrine of Incns
rea in a system of criminal laws and precisely why strict liability is odious.
The present book represents a set of lectures given by Lady Wootton under
the auspices of the Hamlyn Trustees, who were well advised to invite her to
be the first layman to contribute to their series. Law, especially the criminal
law, is too important a thing to leave to lawyers.
In what follows I shall be principally concerned with Lady Wootton's dis-
cussion in the second and third of the four chapters of this book, of criminal
responsibility, for her scepticism of the doctrine of inens rca is of equal im-
1. Assisted by Vera G. Seal and Rosalind Chambers. London, G. Allen & Un,;in
(1959).
2. 76 L.Q. REv. 224 (1960).
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portance and application on both sides of the Atlantic. But the other chapters
of her book, though less relevant to American conditions, should not be
skipped. The first of them presents a concise statistical picture of the growth
of crime in England and characteristically identifies a number of detailed
questions and hypotheses which might be profitably investigated instead of the
traditional but virtually meaningless general questions which have proved such
blind alleys in the past. Lady Wootton shows how disregard of the extraor-
dinary heterogeneity of crimes (which makes it rational to suppose that the
causes of crime might be at least as various as the causes of letter writing) has
allowed stereotypes of "the criminal" and "the delinquent" to invade and ob-
scure discussion. What she terms the "omnibus" type of criminological research
has often been prejudiced by the uncritical assumption that any offender
against the criminal law must somehow be "different" from other human be-
ings, and that the explanation of his crime must be found in personal peculiar-
ities rather than in the circumstances and experiences (including the possibly
"criminogenic" experience of previous conviction and punishment) which pre-
cede, surround or precipitate an offence. Among topics deserving more atten-
tion than they have received Lady Wootton includes the extraordinary but as
yet unexplained sex-differential evident in the English statistics. Male crimi-
nality at all ages in England is seven or eight times as great as that of females:
at some ages (the youngest) the ratio is as great as 17:1 and at its smallest
(the oldest age group) it is 4 :1. Some process of cultural conditioning must,
Lady Wootton thinks, be at work in one sex from which the other, in spite of
similar social and economic conditions, is exempt. She suggests that one profit-
able line of enquiry would be to examine the minority cases where women
commit crimes predominantly committed by men.
In her fourth chapter Lady Wootton gives a picture of the unsatisfactory
sentencing procedure in English courts where the judges have so vast a dis-
cretion, since commonly only a maximum sentence is fixed by law. Here the
sentencers, who are essentially amateurs in the sense that nothing in their
education or training at the bar specifically equips them for the business of
choosing appropriate sentences, commonly discharge this function by "weigh-
ing" in more or less intuitive fashion (often with inadequate information and
time for consideration) a variety of conflicting considerations: the sentence
must if possible deter the criminal and others from repeating the crime; it
must be appropriate to the degree of the criminal's "culpability" or wickedness;
it must aid in his reform; and according to such high judicial authority as Lord
Denning it must adequately express the moral horror of the community for the
crime. Rationalizations of these methods are no doubt on their way, partly as a
result of the report of the Streatfeild Committee,3 of which Lady Wootton was
herself a member. But it is still necessary and salutary in England to plead, as
Lady Wootton does here, for more whole-hearted recognition of the obvious
3. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Business of the Criminal Courts
(H.M.S.O. 1961) Cmnd. 1289.
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implications of a sentencing policy aimed primarily at the prevention of crime.
Certainly if the responsibility for sentencing is to be left to the courts the effi-
ciency of judicial sentencing should be improved by the provision of both some
instruction in penology and as much relevant information as the still imperfect
prediction studies and the follow-up of particular case-histories can provide.
But even if such improvements are made Lady Wootton is skeptical of the
wisdom of leaving to the courts their present function of fixing determinate
sentences. For reasons in part connected with her views on criminal responsi-
bility she favours sentences which are indeterminate both as to the type of in-
stitution, penal or medical, to which the offender is to go, and as to their dura-
tion. She would wish the courts as guardians of individual liberty to fix a
maximum for any sentence involving detention, but subject to that reserva-
tion she considers that sentences should no longer be a judicial but an adminis-
trative matter to be administered by bodies analogous to the Parole Board
familiar in the United States.
II
Lady Wootton's views on sentencing policy and procedure are still highly
controversial in England. Still more so are her sceptical views on criminal re-
sponsibility though she writes in the firm belief that there are already many
developments in English penal law and practice (including the "proliferation"
of offences of strict liability) which show that things are slowly but surely
proceeding in the direction in which she would have them go. Her views on
this matter can best be understood and criticised if we contemplate the penal
system which would result if the development which she favours away from
the doctrine of mens rea were finally consummated. In such a system, once it
has been established that a person's outward conduct is comprised in the defini-
tion of some crime, this without proof of any vnics rca would be sufficient for
conviction and so to bring him within the ambit of compulsory measures to be
chosen by the court. These measures may be penal or medical or both; or it
may be found that the prisoner is not likely to repeat his offence and so may
be discharged. The choice between these alternatives would not be made by
reference to the offender's state of mind at the time of his crime; the sole ques-
tion for consideration would be what minimum action in view of his present
psychological state, character, and situation, is likely to prevent a recurrence
of the offence.
It will be observed that this system concentrates attention on the prevention
of crime on the part of the individual convicted rather than on the deterrence
of potential offenders. Lady Wootton anticipates criticism on this score and
urges that since we are almost totally ignorant of the deterrent effect on poten-
tial offenders attributable to particular sentences we should normally give pri-
ority, though not always exclusive consideration, to the effect of a particular
measure upon the offender himself. The system with its emphasis on the pre-
vention by minimum action of future crime explicitly blurs the line between
penal and medical treatment. Prisons and hospitals would alike be "simply
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places of safety" in which offenders will receive "the treatment which experi-
ence suggest is most likely to evoke the desired response." They will be separate
only because there will be those "for whom medicine has nothing to offer" who
might benefit from measures which at present we think of as "penal" such as
imprisonment for deterrent purposes. It should however be noted that the sys-
tem envisaged by Lady Wootton is not intended solely for those who would be
classed at present as mentally abnormal. The whole doctrine of sncns rea and
not merely that part of it which provides for mental abnormality would be
dropped from the law so that the distinctions which at present we make before
convicting a sane offender, between e.g., intentional and accidental wrong-
doing, would no longer be relevant prior to conviction, though they may in-
directly provide useful evidence at the sentencing stage for the diagnosis and
treatment of the offender. So, to show that an accused had wounded another
accidentally would not save him from conviction and liability to such preventive
treatment, penal or therapeutic, as the court might think necessary. Though, as
Lady Wootton is careful to insist, only the minimum action pecessary for pre-
ventive purposes should be taken.
Many would refuse to describe a system which thus dispenses with inens rea
as one of criminal punishment. Lady Wootton gladly embraces this conclusion
and indeed laments the fact that at present "even the most progressive of law-
yers" are obsessed with the idea that the sentence of the criminal court is a
punishment. What she offers in the place of a system of punishment is in fact a
system of purely forward-looking social hygiene in which our only concern
when we have an offender to deal with is with the future and the rational aim
of prevention of further crime.
What are the reasons for adopting such a system? Lady Wootton has sup-
ported her case with a wide range of different arguments. From her earlier
studies of the criminal responsibility of the mentally abnormal she drew the
conclusion that the question whether a man who has broken law could have
acted differently is in principle unanswerable. No scientific tests have been de-
vised which can discriminate offenders who are "responsible" in this sense from
those who are not; the evidence put before courts in Lady Woottons' view at
the best only establishes the propensity of a person to commit crimes of certain
sorts and from this it is a fallacy to infer that he could not have done otherwise.
I shall not consider here these arguments, partly because they are now familiar
to many and partly because they are not elaborated in the book tinder review.
Instead I shall consider the argument which is most prominent in this book
and which should not pass unchallenged. This is to the effect that if the aim
of the criminal law is "the prevention of socially damaging actions" and not
retribution for past wickedness, the doctrine of mens rea puts the investigation
of the offender's mind "into the wrong place." Such investigation on a preven-
tive theory of punishment can be relevant only after conviction as a guide to
the measures to be taken to prevent a repetition of the crime. It is therefore
"illogical" to make inens rea part of the definition of the crime and a necessary
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condition of the offender's liability to compulsory measures. The conventional
doctrine of wens rea can only make sense or be "logical" within the framework
of a retributive theory according to which punishment is used and justified as
an "appropriate" return for past wickedness and not merely as a prevention
of anti-social conduct.
This argument is I think mistaken though many writers besides Lady \oot-
ton have used it, sometimes for purposes quite alien to hers. It rests I think on
the illusory idea that our only interest in asking whether those whom we punish
could at the time of their offence have conformed to the law is to determine
whether they were "wicked" in doing what they did. This altogether ignores
an outlook on punishment which is surely common, intelligible and, except per-
haps for determinists (among whom Lady Wootton does not number herself)
perfectly defensible. According to this outlook we should restrict even punish-
ment designed as "preventive" to those who at the time of their offence had
the capacity and a fair opportunity or chance to obey the law: and we should
do this out of considerations of fairness or justice to those whom we punish.
This is an intelligible ideal of justice to the individual and remains intelligible
even when we punish to protect society from harm in the future and not to
"pay back" the harm that those whom we punish have done. Viewed in this
way as a restriction imposed on preventive punishment by considerations of
fairness or justice to individuals the doctrine of mens rea presents an aspect
neglect of which renders Lady Wootton's argument inconclusive. For such a
restriction on punishment has a perfectly "logical" place even within a preven-
tive theory. To show this we can usefully draw upon the ideas and terminology
of economics. Let us consider the idea of maximising a certain variable subject
to a restraint. In this case the variable will be the efficiency of the system in
reducing harmful crime. Plainly, without any illogicality or inconsistency we
might acknowledge this as our purpose in punishing but also wish it to be
pursued only subject to certain restraints. Some of these restraints might be
held absolute in the sense that no increase in the efficiency of the system would
be allowed to compensate for the slightest infringement of the restraint. A veto
on the use of torture might, for example, be such an absolute restraint; and it
is conceivable (and perhaps desirable) that we should treat as an absolute re-
straint the principle of niens rea that no-one who lacked the capacity or a fair
opportunity or chance to conform to law at the time of his offence should be
punished. But of course we might have a less absolute system than this, and
plainly, so far as we countenance strict liability for minor offences we have a
mixed system which allows certain alleged increases in efficiency to counter-
balance the injustice done to individuals by infringements of time restraint im-
posed by the principle of noens rea.
More persuasive than the mistaken identification of the doctrine of mens rea
with a purely retributive theory of punishment are the practical considerations
that Lady Wootton urges against the doctrine at least as it operates in England.
It may well be that through the doctrine of nens rea we secure justice for those
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whom we punish at too great a cost in terms of social security and that this
cost would be avoided if we abandoned the restraints imposed by the doctrine
and made all offences into crimes of strict liability. It may well be as Lady
Wootton says that too often "we turn a blind eye on socially damaging acts
due to carelessness, negligence, or even accident." Yet important as these prac-
tical considerations are, there are equally practical objections to the wholesale
elimination of wens rea from the criminal law and to these I think Lady Woot-
ton pays insufficient attention. The first and most important concerns individual
freedom. In a system in which proof of mens rea was no longer a necessary
condition for conviction the occasions for official interferences in our lives
would be vastly increased. If the doctrine of inens rea were abolished, every
blow, even if it was apparent that it was accidental or merely careless, and
therefore not under the present law a criminal assault, would in principle be a
matter for investigation under the new scheme. This is so because the possi-
bilities of a curable condition would have to be investigated and if possible
treated. No doubt under the new regime prosecuting authorities would use
their common-sense; but a very great discretion would have to be entrusted to
them to sift from the mass the cases worth investigation for either penal or
therapeutic treatment. This expansion of police powers would bring with it
great uncertainty for the individual citizen and, though official interference
with his life would be more frequent, he will be less able to predict their in-
cidence if any accidental breach of the criminal law may be an occasion for
them.
A second objection is this. Lady Wootton looks forward to the day when
"the formal distinction" between medical and penal treatment and between hos-
pital and prison will have vanished. At present one of the features distinguish-
ing punishment from treatment is that unlike a medical inspection followed by
detention in hospital, conviction by a court followed by a sentence of imprison-
ment is a public act expressing the odium of society for those who break the
law, or at least for their conduct in doing so. As long as this odium attaches
to conviction and sentence a moral objection to their use on those who could
not have helped doing as they did will always remain. On the other hand, if
with the operation of the new system, conviction and imprisonment will in time
be assimilated to, and no more odious than, a compulsory medical inspection
followed by detention in hospital, it seems that the law will lose an important
element in its authority and deterrent force. Some would say that this element
is more important as a deterrent than the actual punishment administered.
A third objection needing some careful consideration concerns the claim that
a satisfactory criminal code could be framed without the "illogical" reference
to mens rea in the definition of offences. The difficulty is that there are some
socially harmful activities which can only be identified by reference to inten-
tion or some other mental element. A clear example of this is the idea of an
attempt to commit a crime. It is obviously desirable that persons who attempt
crimes, even if they fail, should be brought before courts for punishment or
treatment; yet what distinguishes an attempt which fails from an innocent
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activity is, in many cases, just the fact that it is a step taken with the intention
of bringing about some harmful consequence.
Ill
Besides the topics I have mentioned much else is iluminatingly discussed in
this short book. Indeed the ratio of thoughts to words is astonishingly high -
a fact which imparts to many of Lady Wootton's observations an unforgettable
quality. This is especially true of her critical comments on the archaic atmos-
phere and conventional procedures of the English forensic process, many of
which, as she says, "seem incongruous in a scientific age." Few lawyers (on
either side of the Atlantic) will fail to enjoy and profit from Lady Wootton's
blend of wisdom, irreverence and wit.
H. L. A. HART*
*Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University.
TiE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUBJECTIVE
FAcTORS IN LAW, BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH GERMAN LAWYERS. By
Walter 0. Weyrauch.* Forward by Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. Mc-
Dougal. New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii,
316. $7.50.
THIS is an unusual, fascinating and troubling book. The author, now a Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Florida, was from 1948 to 1952 a practicing
lawyer in Germany. He then moved to the United States, which he appears to
have found more congenial to his personality. A decisive period of the author's
American re-education was spent at the Yale Law School, where he was at-
tracted by the work, the research interests, and the methods of Harold Lass-
well and Myres McDougal. The author's interest in the ways in which society
actually functions, the roles played in it by the law and the lawyers, and the
devices by which democratic values may be strengthened by the law and its
manipulators has found expression in his earlier writings. The present book is
also centered around these questions.
Weyrauch, believing in the comparative method, approaches these questions
by drawing a collective portrait of the German lawyer. Express comparisons
with America are made in several places, but to what extent, if any, conclu-
sions about the United States can be drawn from Germany, remains doubtful.
The collective portrait of the German lawyer that emerges from Weyrauch's
inquiry is devastating. The author's method was to interview some German
lawyers in such a way that a free flow of associations would reveal essential
personality traits. As the interviews are reported, the subjects appear to have
*Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Florida.
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